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In 1988, John Carlin argued in an article in this Journal that fair use should be 
extended to cover works of appropriation art so as to protect appropriative artists 
from claims of copyright infringement.1  He wrote that “[a]n extension of fair use 
to cover artistic use through Appropriation would not compromise either the 
underlying logic of copyright law, or the intent of Congress in creating a legislative 
exception to copyright monopoly in the fair use doctrine.”2  In 1992, artist Jeff 
Koons unsuccessfully argued that one of his sculptures, which borrowed heavily 
from a photograph he purchased in a card shop, was fair use.3  But in 1994, the 
Supreme Court ruled that works of appropriation art do not inherently infringe on 
the original author’s copyright.4  Since then, courts have moved towards embracing 
Carlin’s view that copyright should encourage appropriation art by accepting such 
art as fair use, not condemn it by finding such art to be infringement.  The most 
recent development came from the Second Circuit in Cariou v. Prince, where the 
court of appeals embraced perhaps the most expansive interpretation of fair use of 
any court yet.5  Up to this point, however, these cases have only involved visual art. 
This Note seeks to track the progress that courts have made towards accepting 
appropriation art as fair use and argues that the reasoning from recent cases dealing 
with visual art can also be applied to music.  Specifically, this Note argues that the 
legal standards for appropriation art in the visual and musical contexts have 
diverged, and that this should be corrected.  Sampling—an integral part of the hip-
hop genre—is the use of small portions of existing sound recordings to create new 
musical works.  The practice has been the subject of several unfavorable court 
rulings since the 1990s, which, this Note argues, have imposed undue restrictions 
on the practice, particularly when compared with contemporaneous rulings in the 
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 1. See generally John Carlin, Culture Vultures:  Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property 
Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103 (1988). 
 2. Id. at 135. 
 3. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 4. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 5. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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visual art context.  The Prince ruling opens the door for courts to correct this 
disparity by applying the same standards of fair use in the musical and in the visual 
arts. 
Part I first sets forth the general principles of the fair use standard and provides 
relevant background on the development of appropriation art and sampling.  It then 
recounts how the law has responded to appropriation art and sampling and 
discusses the failures of the sample licensing market.  Part II closely examines how 
the Prince decision interprets and develops past fair use precedent.  Part III 
identifies how the Prince framework can be used to justify finding certain instances 
of sampling to be fair use. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON FAIR USE, SAMPLING AND APPROPRIATION 
ART 
A.  FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
The foundation of United States copyright law is the constitutional directive to 
Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”6  The stated end of copyright law is to increase the 
amount of knowledge and creative work available to the public.  To encourage the 
dissemination of such works, the Constitution allows Congress to grant authors 
certain exclusive rights over their works.  These exclusive rights, limited in time 
and scope, include the right to distribute copies to the public, to perform or display 
the work publicly, to reproduce the work, and to prepare derivative works.7 
Because the Founding Fathers sought to provide just enough incentive to create, 
these rights have developed in a non-absolute manner to prevent certain undesirable 
conflicts.8  The fair use doctrine is an equitable rule allowing the judiciary to 
interpret copyright laws in a way that preserves balance between the interests of 
artists and the public.9  Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act codified the four-
factor fair use test originally set forth by Justice Story in Folsom v. March, but it 
otherwise provides little instruction on what is considered fair use.10  What has 
resulted is a flexible doctrine that has been adapted in various ways to prevent the 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 8. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS & COPYWRONGS:  THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 21 (2001).  But see id., noting that in recent decades 
copyright has also been viewed as a “property right.” 
 9. See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 406 (2005) (describing judicial treatment of fair use as a “safety 
valve” for a variety of policy, fairness and autonomy reasons). 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4901) (Story, J.) (articulating four-factor fair use test); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1990) (“Beyond stating a preference for the critical, 
educational, and nonprofit over the commercial, the statute tells little about what to look for in the 
‘purpose and character’ of the secondary use.  It gives no clues at all regarding the significance of ‘the 
nature of’ the copyrighted work.”). 
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monopoly of copyright from upending the constitutional goal of promoting the arts 
and sciences.11 
As the language of the law makes clear,12 these statutory factors are not 
exclusive.  Courts have considered other factors that they believe are relevant to 
determining fair use.13  Over the last twenty years, there have been immense 
changes in the types of uses that courts have found to be fair.  One of the areas that 
has undergone drastic change is that of appropriation art, where artists have 
attempted to expand the boundaries of fair use in an effort to legitimize their work. 
B.  HISTORY OF SAMPLING & CASE LAW 
Sampling is the act of incorporating portions of existing sound recordings into a 
new musical composition.14  By its very definition, sampling is a form of 
appropriation art.  Hip-hop music was initially created by DJs, who would use two 
turntables, both playing the same record, to extend a particular section of music for 
a lengthened period.15  DJs would isolate and extend a song’s “break”—the section 
where only the drummer was playing—allowing room for the Master of 
 
 11. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that the fair use 
doctrine “‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on 
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster’” (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990))). 
 12. The statutory section reads: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is 
a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or 
is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all the above factors.  
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 13. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (emphasizing the importance of “transformative use” in the 
fair use analysis).  Congress intended this rule to be applicable on an ad hoc basis, particularly to 
facilitate responsiveness to rapid technological changes.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67 (1976) (“The bill 
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to 
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.”). 
 14. Bruce J. McGiverin, Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity:  Protecting 
Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1987). 
 15. KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:  OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND 
OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 69 (2005) [hereinafter MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].  As a 
historical note, there are many known instances of sampling prior to hip-hop.  Sampling began as a 
technique known as “music concrète,” developed by Pierre Shaeffer, a French radio broadcaster, in the 
1940s.  Morgan Poyau, Original Creator:  Pierre Schaeffer, THE CREATORS PROJECT (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://perma.cc/CG4C-MDPQ. 
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Ceremonies (MC) to address the crowd.16  An early example of this technique was 
the Sugarhill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” which sampled “Good Times” by the 
band Chic.17  However, instead of sampling the original sound recording, the 
Sugarhill Gang’s producer had musicians re-record the song to use as a backing 
track.18  The song became hip-hop’s first radio hit, and is considered by many to 
have popularized the genre on an international scale.19 
With the advent of digital samplers and the decreasing costs of electronic music 
equipment, sampling began to increase in complexity and prevalence.20  These 
machines had the capacity to record sounds from multiple sources and then 
manipulate them in various ways.21  In the late 1980s, sampling reached its apex as 
groups such as Public Enemy and the Beastie Boys released albums containing 
hundreds of samples.  Hank Shocklee, a producer for Public Enemy, described the 
process:  “[W]e were taking a horn hit here, a guitar riff there, we might take a little 
speech, a kicking snare from somewhere else.  It was all bits and pieces.”22  The 
result was a collage of sound. 
During this time, it was unclear to musicians, record labels and legal 
practitioners how courts would treat sampling with respect to copyright law.23  
Complicating this uncertainty is the fact that there are two distinct copyrights 
contained in a song.24  First, there is the musical composition, which consists of the 
music and lyrics.25  The author of a musical composition is generally the composer 
and lyricist.26  The musical composition can be embodied in a number of ways, 
such as sheet music or in the form of a phonorecording.27  The second copyright 
attaches to the actual sound recording of a song.28  What this means is that if 
someone wanted to produce and distribute a CD of his favorite album, he would 
need to obtain a license from the copyright holders of both the sound recording and 
the underlying musical composition.  These copyrights are often held by different 
entities:  a songwriter or publishing company typically holds the rights to the 
musical composition, whereas sound recording copyrights are usually assigned to a 
 
 16. MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 71. 
 17. Steven Daly, Hip-Hop Happens, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2005, at 250, available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2005/11/hiphop200511. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Nile Rodgers and Bernard Edwards, who wrote “Good Times,” threatened to sue the Sugarhill 
Gang, and the parties eventually reached a settlement whereby Rodgers and Edwards were credited as 
co-writers.  Id. 
 20. MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 77; McGiverin, supra note 14, at 1723 
n.3. 
 21. MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 77. 
 22. Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop, STAY FREE! MAG. (May 31, 
2004), http://perma.cc/F2P5-FUTG [hereinafter McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop]. 
 23. The first sampling lawsuit was not brought until 1991, see Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. 
Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 24. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 56A.0212, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL 
COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND RECORDINGS (2012), available at http://perma.cc/NL3M-K95R. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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record label.29  Unfortunately, courts have struggled with this distinction.  The next 
section will explain how courts have developed different standards for copyright 
infringement for sound recordings and musical compositions. 
1.  Sampling Lawsuits 
a.  Grand Upright 
In the early 1990s, hip-hop’s overall share of total music sales was surging, and 
the industry began to take notice.30  In 1991, a federal court granted an injunction 
against rapper Biz Markie and Warner Brothers Records after they released the 
song “Alone Again,” which contained portions of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s musical 
composition “Alone Again (Naturally).”31  Prior to releasing the song, Biz Markie 
attempted to secure a proper license from O’Sullivan but was rebuffed because 
O’Sullivan felt that Biz Markie’s version did not maintain the integrity of the 
original.32  In Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that the defendant’s admission 
of sampling was enough to constitute copyright infringement.33  This was an 
unusual move.  Copyright infringement cases usually require the court to determine 
whether the defendant’s work is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s before 
making a ruling.34  Because Grand Upright did not contain any similarity analysis, 
sampling artists had “little guidance to ascertain the quantitative and qualitative 
threshold level for future sampling cases.”35 
After Grand Upright, the music industry responded by negotiating licenses 
before releasing any sample-based music.36  With increasing demand, the cost for 
these licenses became expensive, prohibitively so for many artists.37  Some artists, 
like O’Sullivan and Michael Jackson, refused to license their works.38  Independent 
artists, without the backing of a deep-pocketed major record label, were at a 
 
 29. Christopher D. Abramson, Note, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician:  A Proposal 
for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1669–70 (1999). 
 30. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 8, at 133 (“In 1987, rap records represented 11.6 percent of 
all music sales in the United States.  By 1990, rap was 18.3 percent of the music business.”). 
 31. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
 32. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 8, at 142. 
 33. Grand Upright, 780 F. Supp. at 185.  The parties settled after the district court’s ruling and 
“Alone Again” was removed from future printings of the album.  Biz Markie’s next album was titled 
“All Samples Cleared.”  VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 8, at 143. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 54–55. 
 35. Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits:  Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De 
Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 188 (2002) (citing Susan Upton Douglass & Craig S. Mende, 
Deconstructing Music Sampling; Questions Arise as Practice Becomes Increasingly Common, N.Y. L.J., 
Nov. 3, 1997, at S3.). 
 36. Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling:  A Case for Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L. REV. 726, 727 
(1992). 
 37. See MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 68. 
 38. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 8, at 140. 
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creative disadvantage, as they could not afford to sample well-known songs.39  This 
led to a decline in both the amount of samples used and the creative progress of 
hip-hop music.40  As cultural historian Siva Vaidhyanathan noted, “What sampling 
did occur in the late 1990s was non-transgressive, nonthreatening, and too often 
clumsy and obvious.”41  The high costs of sampling meant that many hip-hop acts 
could only afford one sample per song.  What happened to artists like Public 
Enemy, whose entire sound was based in sampling-as-collage?  Public Enemy 
member “Chuck D” commented on this issue in an interview: 
[Our] music was affected more than anybody’s because we were taking thousands of 
sounds.  If you separated the sounds, they wouldn’t have been anything—they were 
unrecognizable.  The sounds were all collaged together to make a sonic wall.  Public 
Enemy was affected because it is too expensive to defend against a claim.  So we had 
to change our whole style . . . by 1991.42 
b.  Bridgeport 
The next major sampling case was decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2006.  In 
Bridgeport, the court held that there was no de minimis defense to sampling a 
sound recording.43  The plaintiffs allegedly owned the copyrights to the sound 
recording of “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” by Funkadelic.44  A three-note, two-
second sample of the song had been slowed down to alter its pitch and tempo, and 
extended to play for four measures in the new song “100 Miles and Runnin’” by 
N.W.A.45 
The district court had agreed with the defendants that this use was de minimis, 
which negated the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim, and granted defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment.46  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that there 
was no de minimis defense to a claim of sound recording copyright infringement.47  
Although the court acknowledged that there were “no existing sound recording 
judicial precedents” on which to base its decision, it explained that this bright-line 
rule would provide parties with clear boundaries, thus increasing judicial 
efficiency.48  The court wrote that the market would control the price for licenses 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 143. 
 42. McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop, supra note 22. 
 43. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005).  The term “de 
minimis” comes from the Latin phrase de minimis non curat lex which translates to “the law cares not 
for trifles.”  Jeff Nemerofsky, What Is a “Trifle” Anyway?, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 340 (2002).  The de 
minimis principle is used in copyright cases where “it can be shown that substantial amount of the 
copyrighted work was not taken.”  Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 
839–40 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
 44. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796. 
 45. Id. (defendants were the producers of a film whose soundtrack included “100 Miles”). 
 46. Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), amended on reh’g, 410 
F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 47. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801. 
 48. Id. at 802. 
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and “keep it within bounds”:  “Get a license or do not sample.  We do not see this 
as stifling creativity in any significant way.”49  Bridgeport has been criticized by 
observers on many grounds,50 including the court’s ignorance of the realities of the 
market for sample licenses.51  Notably, the court did not consider a fair use defense, 
explicitly leaving the issue open for a later case, as it had not been asserted at the 
district court level.52 
The foregoing discussion of Bridgeport relates solely to the unlicensed 
appropriation of a copyrighted sound recording.53  Of course, if artists choose to 
sample a sound recording, they may also need to secure a license to the song’s 
musical composition.  The test for determining copyright infringement of a 
composition is much different from the bright-line rule enunciated by the 
Bridgeport court.  Instead, the standard in the case of a composition is whether the 
secondary work is “substantially similar” to the original.54  The substantial 
similarity test is used “after the fact of copying has been established, as the 
threshold for determining [whether] the degree of similarity suffices to demonstrate 
actionable infringement.”55  In the context of sampling, there is no dispute as to 
whether the secondary artist had access to and copied from a work. 
c.  Newton v. Diamond 
The Ninth Circuit’s 2002 ruling in Newton v. Diamond illustrates why a 
sampling musician does not invariably need to license the underlying musical 
composition.56  The Beastie Boys sampled a six-second, three-note segment of 
“Choir,” a song by jazz flutist James W. Newton.57  While the Beastie Boys had 
obtained a license to use the sound recording, they did not license the sample’s 
 
 49. Id. at 801. 
 50. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.03[B][2][b] 
[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (urging courts to ignore the ruling and instead apply a substantial 
similarity test). 
 51. See Lauren Fontein Brandes, Comment, From Mozart to Hip-Hop:  The Impact of Bridgeport 
v. Dimension Films on Musical Creativity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 123 (2007) (describing how 
samples are often prohibitively expensive and the licensing process is burdensome); id. at 124 (samples 
for popular recordings can cost tens of thousands of dollars).  But see generally Tracy L. Reilly, 
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 398–402 (2008) 
(arguing that existing licensing schemes for sampling do not stifle creativity). 
 52. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
 53. The plaintiffs in Bridgeport included Bridgeport Music and Westbound Records.  Id. at 795.  
Bridgeport claimed that it owned the rights to the musical composition of “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” 
and Westbound claimed that it owned the rights to the sound recording of that song.  Id. at 796.  The 
court assumed that these entities would be able to establish ownership in these respective copyrights.  Id.  
The court found that Bridgeport had previously entered into a “Release and Agreement” with the 
original owners of the composition “100 Miles and Runnin’.”  Id.  This barred Bridgeport’s claims that 
the defendants had infringed on its copyright to the musical composition.  Id. 
 54. M. Leah Somoano, Note, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films:  Has Unlicensed 
Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 
294 (2006) (citing Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 55. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 56. See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 57. Id. at 1190. 
JULIAN AZRAN, HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69 (2014) 
76 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:1 
underlying composition, and Newton sued.58  The Beastie Boys raised two 
defenses:  that the three-note segment lacked sufficient originality to warrant 
copyright protection and that the taking from the composition was de minimis.59  
The district court accepted both arguments and granted the Beastie Boys’ motion 
for summary judgment.60  The court of appeals affirmed that ruling on the ground 
that the taking was de minimis, asserting that “[t]he principle that trivial copying 
does not constitute actionable infringement has long been a part of copyright 
law.”61  A taking was de minimis “only if the average audience would not 
recognize the appropriation.”62  This standard reflects the relationship between a de 
minimis use and a substantially similar taking:  only the latter is recognizable to the 
average listener.63 
Because the Beastie Boys had licensed the sound recording, the court focused its 
inquiry solely as to their “appropriation of the song’s compositional elements.”64  
To do so, the court applied a version of the substantial similarity test that others 
have called “fragmented literal similarity.”65  This standard is used in cases such as 
Newton v. Diamond where a small portion of copyrighted material has been exactly 
copied.66  After considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of the 
copied three notes in relation to the sampled song in its original form,67 the court 
found that the use was de minimis.  The upshot of Newton v. Diamond is that not 
all samples automatically require a license for the underlying musical composition.  
This takeaway will play an important role in the analysis in Part III of this Note. 
2.  Sampling Today 
The Bridgeport court claimed that the sample market would control the price for 
licenses and “keep it within bounds.”  However the market for sample licenses does 
not function the same way as most other markets, which has created problems and 
prevented the sample market from properly allocating prices.  Unlike traditional 
markets such as those for commodities, where the goods are almost always 
fungible, the goods (songs) in the sample market are all unique.  If a rights holder 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 349 F.3d 591 (9th 
Cir. 2003), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 388 F.3d 
1189 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 61. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (“To say that a use is de minimis because no audience would recognize the appropriation 
is thus to say that the use is not sufficiently significant.”). 
 64. Id. at 1193. 
 65. See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 66. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195. 
 67. Fragmented literal similarity involves an extrinsic and intrinsic inquiry.  See Swirsky v. 
Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).  “The extrinsic test considers whether two works share a 
similarity of ideas and expression as measured by external objective criteria.”  Id.  The intrinsic prong 
applies a lay listener test, asking whether a reasonable juror could find the copied portion qualitatively 
or quantitatively substantial.  See id. at 847. 
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demands a high price to license his song, the sampling musician cannot go find 
another seller to license that same song.  This drastically reduces the amount of 
competition in the market and leads to higher prices. 
It is typically necessary for artists to create the sampled works before buying 
licenses for the samples used, though the licensing market problem might be 
mitigated if musicians instead sought out sample licenses before they wrote their 
songs.  In that scenario, there would be greater competition in the market because 
buyers would not already have their heart set on a particular sample.  But the 
creative process does not usually work like that.  It does not make sense for the 
appropriation musician to pay for a license before knowing how the finished song 
will sound.  In addition, for licensors to assess how much they will charge, they 
need to hear the finished song in order to determine how much of the original 
sample is incorporated into the new work.68  Thus, appropriation musicians first 
find the samples that they want to use and then compose the new song.69  Due to 
the transaction costs of obtaining licenses, these musicians will seek out the 
appropriate rights holders only after determining that the song is worthy of 
commercial release.70  Indeed, many rights holders will ask to hear the final song 
before agreeing to license their work.71 
This situation places the licensee at a disadvantage.  At this point, the licensee 
has already invested time and money into creating a new song.  The prospect of 
losing out on those sunk costs gives the licensor greater bargaining power, and 
allows him to extract a higher fee than he otherwise might have secured.  
Furthermore, a licensor, knowing that the licensee’s release date is approaching, 
can hold out in hopes of obtaining a higher bounty for his license.  For these 
reasons, it is unlikely that the sample market has functioned in a way that keeps the 
prices for licenses “within bounds.”72  Other aspects of the sample license market 
will be discussed later in this section. 
Today, many major record labels have clearance departments to facilitate the 
licensing of samples.73  Some labels refuse to clear samples at all and do not accept 
sample-based music.74  It appears that Bridgeport has ushered in a “very rigid 
‘clearance culture’ in which it is assumed that every audio quote should be 
 
 68. See generally Richard Salmon, Sample Clearance:  The SOS Guide to Copyright Law on 
Sampling, SOUND ON SOUND (Mar. 2008), http://perma.cc/6P2K-CJZM (describing samples 
negotiations as being conducted on a case-by-case basis, due to the particularities of the original and 
finished song). 
 69. Josh Norek, You Can’t Sing Without the Bling:  The Toll of Excessive Sample License Fees on 
Creativity in Hip-Hop Music and the Need for a Compulsory Sound Recording Sample License System, 
11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 83, 91 (2004) (“[L]abels have literally had to put an album’s manufacturing on 
hold or pull finished copies off record store shelves until the samples are cleared.  The impact of such 
last-minute actions on a major promotional campaign already underway can be drastic, creating a 
genuine disincentive for the artist and label alike to utilize samples in the recording process.”). 
 70. KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE:  THE  LAW AND CULTURE OF 
DIGITAL SAMPLING 160–61 (2011). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Contra Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 73. Somoano, supra note 54, at 308. 
 74. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 70, at 192. 
JULIAN AZRAN, HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69 (2014) 
78 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:1 
licensed.”75  Many musicians and industry experts have observed the decline of 
sampling in the mainstream segments of the music industry.76  Those who do wish 
to release complex sample-based music are relegated to less commercially viable 
realms.77 
On the other hand, some commentators argue that there is no evidence that 
sampling licenses stifle creativity.78  This argument is counterfactual, since it is 
impossible to ascertain what music would sound like if musicians did not need to 
secure licenses for samples.  Nevertheless, there was a period of time when 
musicians did sample freely, and recreating that style of music today would be 
economically infeasible.  A recent study has demonstrated that re-releasing the 
Beastie Boys’ album Paul’s Boutique, which contained 125 identifiable samples, 
would yield a loss of twenty-million dollars.79  In fact, each record sold would 
increase the loss, thus rendering it impossible to realize a profit.80  Proponents of 
Bridgeport also claim that since “many artists and record companies have sought 
licenses as a matter of course” there is no unfairness or inefficiency.81  This 
argument fails to recognize the high barriers to entry and vertical equity problems 
that arise in the context of sample licensing negotiations.  Many independent artists 
who lack access to substantial financial resources, unlike artists signed to deals 
with major record labels, cannot afford to license popular recordings.82  Further, 
even successful musicians face unfairness.  When a famous musician like Jay-Z 
attempts to clear a sample, the rights holder will often try to exact an unfair price 
 
 75. Id. at 187. 
 76. Id. at 188 (quoting musicologist and copyright expert Dr. Lawrence Ferrara, who notes that 
“[h]istorically, I think we are at a time where we’re sampling less and certainly copyright law had a 
major part in that”; and quoting MC and music producer Aesop Rock, who notes that “[a] lot of 
mainstream stuff now is just avoiding sampling completely.”). 
 77. Id. at 188. 
 78. See generally Reilly, supra note 51. 
 79. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 74, at 208.  In another example, McLeod and DiCola show 
that re-releasing Public Enemy’s Fear of a Black Planet would sustain a loss of more than six million 
dollars.  Id. at 207. 
 80. Id. at 207–08.  Each time a song is sold or played on the radio, the music publisher collects a 
royalty for use of the musical composition and distributes a portion to the songwriters.  See Jesse Feister, 
Copyrights, Licensing, and Royalties:  A Fact Sheet, AM. SONGWRITER (June 27, 2014, 10:35 AM) 
http://perma.cc/4XA5-L99S.  When an artist samples a song and obtains a license from the publisher, 
the sampled songwriters get songwriting credit on the new song, which means that they will take a 
percentage of the publishing royalties.  For songs with multiple samples, it is not uncommon for the 
sampled artists to collectively demand more than 100% of the royalties.  See, e.g., Interview by Red Bull 
Music Acad. with Justin Smith (a.k.a. Just Blaze), Rapper & Founder, Fort Knocks Entm’t, in 
Melbourne, Austl. (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Just Blaze Interview] (transcript available at 
http://perma.cc/L3PM-QZJQ) (stating that the publishing splits on Jay-Z’s “Show Me What Ya Got” are 
“actually over [100%]”). 
 81. Reilly, supra note 51, at 402 (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 
792, 804 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 82. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 74, at 200 (“‘Plenty of times an artist will sample something, 
and we’ll come back with a quote that’s too high or an outright ‘No,’ and the artist will be forced to 
shelve that song and not release it on the album.’”); Norek, supra note 69, at 91 (“For an independent 
artist, the price for clearing a single sample can run more than an entire album’s recording budget.”). 
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from him or her knowing that he or she has deep pockets.83 
Another common argument is that artists are free to recreate the sample with 
musicians and use music editing software to make it sound like the original; 
therefore, the argument goes, there is no impediment to achieving the sound that 
one wants.84  If this were true, the music licensing regime currently in place would 
be more palatable.  Unfortunately, the replayed, non-sampling version often fails to 
achieve the aesthetics of the original, sampling version.85  Because hip-hop began 
as an appropriative art form, the sample aesthetic is likely to enhance the work’s 
cultural cachet, thus increasing its expressive value.  In other words, there is value 
in the subversive quality intrinsic in a work which borrows from another. 
There might also be efficiency gains in allowing unlicensed samples.  First, it 
might be socially inefficient for artists to constantly pay to have the same samples 
replayed.  Second, sampling can have positive effects on the market for sampled 
songs.  A recent paper used Greg Gillis, who is known by the stage name Girl Talk, 
as a case study to illustrate this point.86  Gillis is a musician who creates songs by 
splicing together recognizable portions of others’ music.  He has managed to do so 
without licensing any of the copyrighted songs that he samples.87  The study found 
that sales of the sampled songs in the year after the release of Gillis’ album All Day 
were greater than sales of the songs in the year before the release, to a 92.5% 
statistical significance.88  If high transaction costs and the cost of licensing itself 
prevent a work from being released, then both the sampling and sampled artists 
lose.  But if the work is allowed to be released without a license and both artists are 
able to realize pecuniary gain from it, then both parties win at least from an 
economic standpoint.  However, the sample market currently functions so poorly 
that these potential benefits are not fully captured. 
Professor Michael Heller has written about the effects of sampling litigation on 
the sound of hip-hop.89  He observes that hip-hop music sounds differently today 
than it did in the late 1980s not only because musical tastes have changed, but also 
due to “song owners [who] use their copyrights like big inches.  The collage sound 
in rap is gone from the major music labels.”90  Heller reads this loss of collage 
sound as a diminishment of our collective wealth.91  Too much ownership, he 
 
 83. See Just Blaze Interview, supra note 80 (“Everybody sees my name and they see Jay’s name 
and they get the dollar signs in their eyes.”). 
 84. Reilly, supra note 51, at 391–92 (quoting Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800). 
 85. MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 74, at 190–91. 
 86. W. Michael Schuster II, Fair Use, Girl Talk, and Digital Sampling:  An Empirical Study of 
Music Sampling’s Effect on the Market for Copyrighted Works, 67 OKLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 87. Some have argued that he has never been sued because rights holders are worried that the 
case would lead to a fair use finding in favor of Gillis, establishing a strong precedent against them.  
Robert Levine, Steal This Hook?  D.J. Skirts Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008, at E1. 
 88. Schuster, supra note 86. 
 89. See Michael Heller, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:  HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 13–16 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 14 (noting that collage still exists in underground versions). 
 91. Id. 
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writes, has led to this state of affairs:  “Hip hop music is a victim of gridlock.”92  In 
addition, it is often the case that the original author is not the owner of the 
copyright to his or her work.  In Bridgeport, the plaintiff was not Funkadelic or one 
of the songwriters to “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” but a music “catalog company” 
that controls a portfolio of copyrights to recordings by Funkadelic and other 
musicians.93  Bridgeport Music has filed hundreds of lawsuits against samplers who 
allegedly did not obtain the proper licenses.94  This behavior, known as “sample 
trolling,” occurs when there is “an individual or company who purchases 
copyrights from another artist and enforces those copyrights aggressively for the 
purposes of making money through litigation.”95 
Unlike other markets for licensed uses of popular works, sampling suffers from 
acute symptoms of market failure.  When music venues or public performance 
centers want to have a song performed during a show, they only need to secure a 
public performance license from the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP) or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).96  An individual who wants 
to listen to a song for personal use can purchase that song from iTunes or another 
online music store.  By contrast, sampling lacks a smoothly functioning market, 
which renders licensing less available—or unavailable—to would-be users.97  It 
may be unclear to sampling musicians who the owner of the rights to the 
underlying work is, and the sampling musicians might not know how to go about 
acquiring those rights.98  Even if the owners are easily identifiable, the transaction 
costs of negotiation may be prohibitive, particularly where multiple samples must 
be licensed in order to create a single work.99  This problem of high transaction 
costs, which is present in many other markets for licensed uses, is exacerbated by 
the fact that, for each sample, a sampling musician might have to secure two 
separate licenses—the sound recording and underlying composition—which are 
 
 92. Id.  Heller’s idea of gridlock is that, “When too many people own pieces of one thing, 
whether a physical or intellectual resource, cooperation breaks down, wealth disappears, and everybody 
loses.”  Id. at xiv. 
 93. Jaia A. Thomas, Rise of the Sample Trolls:  99 Problems and a Sample is 1, UPTOWN MAG. 
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://perma.cc/4WRA-PP5Y; see also Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll, SLATE 
(Nov. 16, 2006, 1:50 PM), http://perma.cc/87Q4-3Y72.  Bridgeport’s owner is alleged to have forged 
George Clinton’s signature in order to seize most of the copyrights in his catalog.  Wu, supra.  George 
Clinton himself has denounced the practice of sample trolling:  “We never minded them sampling, or 
covering a song. . . . the people that stole our shit is suing people all over the world and almost killing 
the concept of sampling, which is important for a lot of music.  But we still are out there fighting for that 
right.”  Jeremiah Alexis, George Clinton:  ‘We Never Minded Them Sampling,’ RED BULL MUSIC (May 
14, 2013), http://perma.cc/D2DN-M98F.  Clinton himself was reportedly sued by Bridgeport for using 
his own work.  MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 99. 
 94. Wu, supra note 93. 
 95. Id. 
 96. David Fagundes, Efficient Copyright Infringement, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1813 (2013). 
 97. Id. at 1813–14. 
 98. Id. (explaining that this phenomenon is especially true for artists who are not sophisticated 
repeat participants in licensing transactions). 
 99. Id.; MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 74, at 207–08 (studies showing that it would be 
economically unfeasible to release albums containing dozens of samples). 
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usually held by different entities.100 
Professor Wendy Gordon explained that when the costs associated with 
acquiring a use license become greater than the value the user expects to internalize 
for the work, the user is likely to forgo the use altogether.101  Others have argued 
that there are many unauthorized uses that are socially valuable, but not sufficiently 
so to outweigh the costs of acquiring the necessary licenses.102  One scholar gives 
the example of a DJ who creates a mashup song consisting entirely of twenty-five 
samples.103  In theory, this DJ could have acquired licenses for the uses of the 
respective works of authorship.  But even if ownership of the borrowed works is 
clear, the costs, including time and effort, of negotiating as many as fifty separate 
licenses, are so high that they are unlikely to be outweighed by the DJ’s relatively 
low-profit expectations for his song.104  Gordon argued that fair use should be 
allowed when market failure prevents socially valuable works from being created 
or disseminated.105  She broadly defines “market failure” as any situation in which 
private transactions cannot be relied upon to fulfill public goals.106  The 
constitutionally-stated purpose of copyright is “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”107  If we assume that this is in fact the public goal of 
copyright, then Gordon’s argument for allowing fair use in instances of market 
failure should be uncontroversial. 
This section has given a brief overview of the history of sampling, how courts 
have responded to it and the symptoms of market failure that have arisen in the 
wake of those decisions.  The next section will provide a short review of the history 
of appropriation art and how it connects to sampling, and then will discuss the fair 
use cases that arose in this realm. 
C.  HISTORY OF VISUAL APPROPRIATION ART 
Appropriation can be broadly defined as the act of taking or copying preexisting 
elements to create a new work.108  Examples of appropriation can be found in many 
 
 100. Although compulsory licenses are available to those who create new arrangements to old 
songs, they are not available to those who “change the basic melody or fundamental character of the 
work.”  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 73.0311, COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND 
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS (2011) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), available at http://perma.cc/J69D-PNBE. 
 101. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure]. 
 102. Fagundes, supra note 96, at 1814. 
 103. A mashup is a song created by mixing different song recordings.  Id. at 1814–15. 
 104. Id. at 1815. 
 105. See generally Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 101. 
 106. Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:  Transaction Costs Have 
Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 151 (2003) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Excuse and Justification]. 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 108. Art Today:  Appropriation, WALKER ART CENTER, http://perma.cc/WQ4N-T3B5 (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2014). 
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creative mediums.  James Joyce’s Ulysses and T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland each 
borrowed fragments from existing art to create literary masterpieces.109  Andy 
Warhol and Jasper Johns took soup cans and flags and elevated them to fine art.110  
Public Enemy and the Beastie Boys sampled the musicians that they grew up 
listening to and reused them to create an entirely new aesthetic of sonic collage.111  
The borrower-as-creator has been a constant presence in the history of intellectual 
production.112 
During the late twentieth century, appropriation became an integral part of the 
creative process for many artists.  John Carlin describes appropriation as an 
“important, and perhaps . . . inevitable chapter in the evolution of Modern art.”113  
Mass media and communication have transformed our collective sense of reality, 
which now “owes as much to the media as it does to a direct, unmediated 
perception of nature.”114  Some artists appropriate the popular images that pervade 
our daily lives “in order to help us understand the process by which the media has 
come to monopolize huge chunks of reality.”115 
Pop art challenges traditions of fine art by transforming and recontextualizing 
images taken from vehicles of popular culture such as advertising.116  For 
philosopher Jean Baudrillard, Pop art represented a turning point in art history; art 
became the reproduction of signs of consumer society, which itself is primarily a 
system of signs.117  Appropriation as literal quotation of popular imagery “helped 
shift the basic mode of representation in Western art from a mimetic to a semiotic 
basis.”118  Semiotic figuration is based on the idea that all perception is subjective.  
This theory holds that there is no objective, stable reality from which objects can be 
transcribed into art.119  Accepting the legitimacy of appropriation art as more than 
mere plagiarism requires a recognition of the rise of semiotic figuration in late 
twentieth century art.120  For one to appreciate appropriation as new expression, as 
 
 109. Carlin, supra note 1, at 106. 
 110. Id. at 110. 
 111. See MCCLEOD &DICOLA, supra note 74, at 201–12. 
 112. See, e.g., John T. Winemiller, Recontextualizing Handel’s Borrowing, 15 J. MUSICOLOGY 
444, 447í49 (1997) (describing instances of “transformative imitation” in various artistic forms in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
 113. Carlin, supra note 1, at 108. 
 114. Id. at 104. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 110. 
 117. Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard and Art (unpublished essay, UCLA), available at 
http://perma.cc/K2ZT-33FP.  Distinguish “representational art which copied tangible objects in the 
‘real’ world from recent art which copies the images already circulating as two-dimensional signs 
through the media.”  Carlin, supra note 1, at 109 n.20 (citing Julia Kristeva, REVOLUTION OF POETIC 
LANGUAGE (1975)).  These two-dimensional signs include advertisements, print media and television.  
See id. at 103í04. 
 118. Carlin, supra note 1, at 110 n.24 (“Mimetic figuration refers to a one-to-one correspondence 
between the object depicted in art and its original existence as a tangible object in the real world.  
Semiotic figuration is based upon the notion that all perception is subjective and therefore there is no 
tangible, stable real world from which objects can be transcribed into art.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 110. 
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opposed to theft, one must appreciate the modern condition:  that we exist in a 
social habitat increasingly determined by simulated signs.  “The realm of the 
‘imaginary’ has supplanted that of the ‘real’ in determining our sense of self and 
nature.  As a result, artists now represent beer cans and Coke bottles as readily as 
they once did apples and oranges.”121  By broadening the artist’s vocabulary in this 
way, the artist’s ability to communicate with the viewer is enhanced. 
The increasing pervasiveness of appropriation in visual art during the mid-
twentieth century led art critics to begin questioning fundamental notions of 
authorship.  In his essay “The Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes took issue 
with the notion that works of art have fixed, objective meanings prescribed by the 
artist.122  Instead, Barthes postulated that meaning is only subjective; it is produced 
by the reader while interacting with a work.123  Under this modern conception of 
authorship, copyright’s conferral of privilege and power is inherently problematic; 
the artist is granted near-exclusive control over his or her work even though the 
artist does not supply all of the meaning in the work.  Michel Foucault alluded to 
this problem in his response to Barthes’ essay, commenting that “the notion of 
‘author’ constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of 
ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences.”124  The “author” is 
simply a social construct, but individualization allows this idealized “author” to 
serve “as a locus for a complex network of activities and judgments that deal with 
ownership, power, knowledge, expertise, constraints, obligations, penalties and 
retribution.”125  In the case of appropriation art, where a work has been transformed 
and recontextualized, this tension between authorship and privilege/power is 
augmented due to the intermediary force of a second artist.  Now, the original 
artist’s “meaning” is twice removed from his or her audience—if it remains at all.  
In this context, arguments for granting the original artist ownership and control 
rights over the secondary work are severely weakened. 
Deconstructing “authorship” will hardly prevent the ever-growing concentration 
of content ownership and control.126  But it is important to understand these 
philosophical underpinnings in order to properly contextualize the various 
arguments relating to fair use and copyright policy. 
1.  Appropriation Art and Sampling 
Similar to Pop art, hip-hop can also be seen as a product of social condition.  
Hip-hop has been described as a “culture [that was] founded upon a lack of 
 
 121. Id. at 110í11. 
 122. See ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath 
trans., Hill & Wang ed. 1978). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101 (Paul Rabinow ed., 
1984). 
 125. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 8, at 9–10.  In the context of this Note, we can substitute this 
complex network with copyright law, which grants similar privileges to those mentioned above. 
 126. Id. at 10. 
JULIAN AZRAN, HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69 (2014) 
84 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:1 
resources.”127  Sampling was viewed as a necessity to many early hip-hop artists 
who lacked the resources to purchase musical instruments and lessons.128  Even 
today, when the costs of music production are historically low, artists sample as a 
way of re-contextualizing their social environment.  Jay-Z’s song “Hard Knock 
Life” borrowed heavily from “It’s the Hard Knock Life” from the musical Annie.129  
Using the chorus from the original song, Jay-Z surrounds the listener with vivid 
imagery from his youth in the Marcy Projects, a public housing complex in 
Brooklyn.130  One might characterize this borrowing as lazy, a way of “avoid[ing] 
the drudgery in working up something fresh.”131  But his use of the original is more 
complicated and allows him to communicate with a broader audience using 
multiple layers of meaning.  In the song, Jay-Z conveys his own understanding of 
what it means to live a “hard knock life.”  By sampling Annie, he juxtaposes these 
divergent meanings in a way that would be impossible without using the sample.  
“Hard Knock Life” unsettles the meaning of the original in the viewer’s mind and 
thus makes a comment on the original work, adding “new expression, meaning or 
message.”132  “[O]nce we know that Jay-Z drew on Annie, we listen to both the 
Broadway song and Jay-Z’s songs differently.”133 
Most sample-based music does not borrow as heavily from a single sample as 
“Hard Knock Life.”  The Beastie Boys’ second album, Paul’s Boutique, is hailed as 
a triumph of multi-layered sampling.134  Unlike “Hard Knock Life,” where one 
sample dominates the song’s musical bed and chorus, the songs on Paul’s Boutique 
were meticulously crafted using as many as fifteen samples on a single song.135  An 
engineer and producer who worked on the album claimed that “[n]inety-five 
 
 127. COMMUNITY CLASSROOM, INDEP. TELEVISION SERV., COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS:  EDUCATOR 
GUIDE 6 (2010) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS:  EDUCATOR GUIDE] (quoting an interview with DJ 
Bobbito Garcia in Benjamin Franzen and Kembrew McLeod’s Copyright Criminals, a 2010 PBS 
Independent Lens documentary), available at http://perma.cc/35HP-42V3. 
 128. See, e.g., Reed Jackson, Kanye West Calls MPC the Guitar of Our Time During Rant, 
XXL.COM (Nov. 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/PZX9-7XKE (quoting Kanye West’s speech at his Nov. 20, 
2013 concert, where West said, “It gave us the ability to chop up bands when we couldn’t afford our 
own band”); see also COPYRIGHT CRIMINALS:  EDUCATOR GUIDE, supra note 127, at 7 (quoting an 
interview with poet and hip-hop artist Saul Williams, who said, “The idea of not having any instruments, 
but having a turntable and saying, well, fine, this is my instrument.  You know?  And you see it now 
with people with overturned buckets and pots and pans.  And we saw it then.”). 
 129. Terry Gross, Jay-Z:  The Fresh Air Interview, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=131334322). 
 130. See JAY-Z, Hard Knock Life (Ghetto Anthem), on VOL. 2. . . HARD KNOCK LIFE (Roc-a-Fella 
1998). 
 131. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 132. Id. at 579. 
 133. MICHELE ELAM, THE SOULS OF MIXED FOLK:  RACE, POLITICS, AND AESTHETICS IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 193 (2011). 
 134. See Mark Kemp, The Beasties’ Golden Age of Sampling, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 5, 2009, at 
72; Nate Patrin, Beastie Boys:  Paul’s Boutique, PITCHFORK (Feb. 13, 2009), http://perma.cc/TR2K-
DKYU (album review). 
 135. A website devoted to discovering all of the samples and references contained in Paul’s 
Boutique.  See PAUL’S BOUTIQUE SAMPLES AND REFERENCES LIST, http://www.paulsboutique.info (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
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percent of the record was sampled.”136  Rolling Stone wrote that the album was “an 
extended goof on Abbey Road, which was Paul McCartney’s boutique—and like 
that record, it ambitiously stitches together song fragments in a way rarely seen 
before or since.”137  Dan LeRoy wrote, “Paul’s Boutique [is] universally 
recognized as a landmark achievement, a masterpiece of rhyme and collage that 
changes in sampling law had insured could never be repeated.”138 
The samples in Paul’s Boutique were not used to avoid the cost and effort of 
producing original musical ideas.  The samples were carefully picked and 
painstakingly pieced together in order to “create the illusion that this is all one solid 
slice of vintage soul.”139  In contrast to the efforts of past musicians, who would 
spend their time attempting to come up with new melodies and rhythms,140 the 
Beastie Boys and the Dust Brothers—the album’s producers—directed their energy 
towards weaving a cohesive sonic collage from pre-existing material.141  
Regardless, the “sweat of the brow” theory of rewarding copyright based on the 
amount of effort put into a work has been rejected by the Supreme Court.142 
2.  Appropriation Art Case Law 
This section will review some of the fair use cases involving appropriation art.  
All of the cases to be discussed in this section were decided prior to Cariou v. 
Prince, which will be examined in Part II. 
In analyzing the fair use of a derivative work, courts weigh the factors together 
in light of the goals of copyright.  “Briefly stated, the use must be of a character 
that serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public 
instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.”143  This 
section will examine how courts have applied the fair use doctrine in cases 
involving appropriation art.  These cases have presented courts with challenging 
issues that appear to set the public interest in promoting the progression of art 
directly against the private interest in rewarding creativity.144  The Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. is the last time that the Court made a 
major statement on the fair use doctrine, and it has since served as a template for 
lower courts to apply the test. 
 
 136. MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 15, at 89 (quoting record producer Mario 
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 138. DAN LEROY, THE BEASTIE BOYS’ PAUL’S BOUTIQUE (33 1/3), at 4 (2006). 
 139. Id. at 77. 
 140. The concept of “originality” or “newness” in music and art is somewhat controversial as there 
are many who believe that there are no truly “original” ideas in music.  See Jim Jarmusch, 5 Golden 
Rules (or Non-Rules) of Moviemaking, MOVIEMAKER MAG. (June 5, 2014), http://perma.cc/U65P-
UTPD; see also Brandes, supra note 51, at 100 (“Sampling is part of a broad musical and artistic 
tradition of borrowing from and elaborating on prior works.”). 
 141. See generally LEROY, supra note 138, at 4. 
 142. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1991). 
 143. Leval, supra note 10, at 1110. 
 144. These goals are not mutually exclusive.  Indeed, it is through private incentive that copyright 
seeks to achieve its public goal of the wide dissemination of art and knowledge. 
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a.  The Impact of Campbell on Fair Use 
i.  First Factor:  Purpose and Character 
Campbell involved a song by hip-hop group 2 Live Crew, “Pretty Woman” —a 
parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.”145  In Campbell, the Supreme Court 
reversed a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which had held that 
commercial uses of copyrighted material were presumptively unfair.146  The Court 
instead found that a use’s commerciality was merely a “factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.”147  The court of appeals had ruled that the new work’s 
commercial nature essentially compelled the court to find against the parodists.148  
Justice Souter, writing for the Supreme Court, explained that the fair use doctrine 
could not be “simplified with bright-line rules.”149  Rather, he directed that courts 
must employ the doctrine so as to “avoid rigid application of the copyright statute 
when . . . it would stifle the very creativity which [the] law is designed to foster.”150  
Since then, lower federal courts have found fair use in a number of commercial 
contexts. 
The first factor in a fair use analysis is “the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes.”151  Campbell’s innovation was its inquiry into the transformative aspects 
of the new work as a principal factor of the first prong of the fair use test: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely 
“supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation, or instead adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work 
is “transformative.”152 
The Court noted that “transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use,” citing its decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, where it held that recording video for non-commercial time-shifting was 
fair use.153  In Sony, the Court wrote that if the user had instead sold those recorded 
programs for profit, then that would almost certainly not be a fair use.154  Thus, in 
 
 145. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572í73 (1994). 
 146. Id. at 595. 
 147. Id. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 
(1985)). 
 148. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (1992) rev’d by 510 U.S. 569. 
 149. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 578 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976)). 
 152. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(No. 4901)). 
 153. Time shifting is the recording of programming, such as a television show, to a storage 
medium, such as a digital video recorder (DVR), to be viewed or listened to at a time more convenient 
to the consumer.  Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 
(1984)). 
 154. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
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the context of non-transformative works, such as a recorded television program, the 
importance of the commercial/noncommercial distinction is enhanced and will 
often drive the fair use analysis.  But in Campbell, the work was transformative and 
the Court’s finding of commerciality did not prevent a fair use finding. 
Here, the Court found that “Pretty Woman” was transformative because of its 
use of the original’s music coupled with a substitution of the original lyrics with 
“shocking ones to show ‘how bland and banal the [original] is.’”155  This was found 
to be a form of parodic criticism, thus advancing the broader goals of fair use.156  
However, commenting on the original work is not a requirement to finding that a 
transformative work is a fair use under Campbell.  Parody, “[l]ike less ostensibly 
humorous forms of criticism, . . . can provide social benefit, by shedding light on 
an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”157  Thus, that a new work 
has been created out of another is itself favorable to a finding of fair use.158 
But the Court was careful to distinguish parodies from satires.  Although both 
involve the creation of a new work, satires are inherently more difficult to justify as 
fair use.  Unlike a parody, which makes a direct comment on the original work, a 
satire uses another work merely as a vehicle to make a broader statement about 
society.  The reason why parodies are privileged is because they “need[] to mimic 
an original to make [their] point,” whereas a satire can “stand on its own two feet 
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing.”159  The Court 
recognized that this distinction is not always clear, and that “parody often shades 
into satire when society is lampooned through its creative artifacts.”160  
Accordingly, when judging the fair use merits of a parody or a satire, a court has to 
work its way through the relevant factors, and make a case-by-case assessment.161  
Therefore parodies are not invariably treated as fair use per se, just as non-parodic 
transformative works, such as satires, are not copyright infringement per se.162 
ii.  Second Factor:  Nature of the Copied Work 
After analyzing the song’s transformativeness, the Court examined the second 
 
 155. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573. 
 156. Id. at 582–83. 
 157. Id. at 579. 
 158. See id. at 580 n.14 (“[W]hen there is little or no risk of market substitution, whether because 
of the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the new work’s minimal distribution in the 
market, the small extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an 
original is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as 
may satire with lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.”). 
 159. Id. at 580–81. 
 160. Id. at 581. 
 161. See id. at 577 (“The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the 
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”). 
 162. See id. at 581 (“Like a book review quoting the copyrighted material criticized, parody may 
or may not be fair use, and petitioners’ suggestion that any parodic use is presumptively fair has no more 
justification in law or fact than the equally hopeful claim that any use for news reporting should be 
presumed fair.”); see also supra note 158 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. atat 580 n.14). 
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fair use factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work.”163  The purpose of this factor 
is to examine the expressive value of the original work, recognizing “that some 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the 
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are 
copied.”164  For example, a news broadcast would be less protected than a movie 
because the former easily lends itself to productive uses by others.165  The Court 
found that the plaintiff’s original work fell within the core of copyright’s protective 
purpose.  However, this was not very helpful to the analysis since parodies, by their 
nature, must copy publicly known creative works.166  Indeed, the second factor 
“typically recedes into insignificance in the greater fair use calculus.”167 
iii.  Third Factor:  Amount and Substantiality 
In contrast, the third factor, whether “‘the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole’ . . . are reasonable in 
relation to the purpose of the copying,” was given a more thorough treatment.168  It 
was at this juncture that the Court considered the parodist’s justification for the 
particular copying done.  This factor interacts with the first factor, as the extent of 
permissible copying will vary depending on the purpose and character of the use.169  
In addition to the relevance of the amount of material taken from the original, 
courts also look to the borrowed portion’s quality and importance to the original 
work.170  A parody’s humor might require a reference to the original work that is 
recognizable so as to “conjure up” the original in the audience’s minds.  Therefore 
substantial copying that borrows from the “heart” of the original work may be 
appropriate.171  Conversely, where the author is not seeking to parodically make a 
direct comment on the original work, the author may have to justify substantial 
copying on other grounds. 
iv.  Fourth Factor:  Effect on the Original’s Potential Market 
Finally, the Court looked to the fourth factor of the fair use test— “the effect of 
 
 163. Id. at 586 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1976)). 
 164. Id. at 586. 
 165. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984), cited 
by Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 166. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 167. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][2][a]. 
 168. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976)). 
 169. Id. at 586–87 (“[R]eproduction of entire work ‘does not have its ordinary effect of militating 
against a finding of fair use’ as to home videotaping of television programs . . . .” (quoting Sony, 464 
U.S. at 449–50)); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (noting 
that “even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news 
account of a speech” but not in a scoop of a soon-to-be-published memoir). 
 170. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
 171. Id. at 588 (“[T]he heart is also what most readily conjures up the song for parody, and it is the 
heart at which parody takes aim.”). 
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the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”172  This 
prong of the test can be read as a balancing mechanism that seeks to protect the 
author’s monopoly interest in his or her copyrighted work.  To that end, harm may 
be found in either the primary market for the original or in the market for 
derivatives of the original.173  A commercial non-transformative use has a high 
likelihood of usurping the original’s primary market.174  However, the Court 
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s presumption that a commercial use necessarily meant 
that there is likelihood of harm to the primary market where the work is 
transformative.175  This presumption was in error, the Court wrote, in part because 
a parody will rarely serve as a substitute for the original in the primary market.176 
In the derivative market, on the other hand, it is possible that a parody will usurp 
the original author’s ability to issue licenses for other derivative uses.  But such 
economic harm must be distinguished from any injury sustained by the author 
resulting from harsh criticism that “kills demand for the original,” which does not 
factor into the analysis.177  Only harm that results from actual market substitution is 
relevant to this inquiry.178 
The market for potential derivative uses is protectable only to the extent that a 
creator “would in general develop or license others to develop.”179  Since creators 
would be unlikely to grant licenses to those wishing to parody or otherwise criticize 
their work, copyright does not protect such markets under the fourth factor.180  But 
it was under this prong that the Campbell Court noted that the parody at issue was 
also a rap song, and that there needed to be an inquiry into whether the original 
sustained harm in that derivative market.181  In this context, the Court wrote that 
even if the derivative enhanced the original’s market, it would not necessarily make 
an act of copying fair.182  Since there was insufficient evidence on whether the 
parody had any effects on the original’s market for derivative non-parodic rap 
versions of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the Court remanded for further findings.183  Only 
then could it be determined whether “Pretty Woman” was a protectable fair use 
parody. 
Although the Court did not resolve the merits of the fair use claim in their 
entirety, the analysis in Campbell advanced the notion that certain commercial 
 
 172. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976)). 
 173. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587. 
 174. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. 
 175. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 570 (“Sony itself called for no hard evidentiary presumption.”). 
 176. Id. at 591–92 (“But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market 
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”). 
 177. Id. at 592. 
 178. See id. at 593. 
 179. Id. at 592. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 593. 
 182. Id. at 590 n.21.  The Court has not yet resolved this issue of whether enhancing the original 
work’s market would tend towards finding fair use or not. 
 183. Id. at 594.  After remand, the parties reached a settlement whereby Acuff-Rose dismissed the 
lawsuit and 2 Live Crew paid for a license.  See Acuff-Rose Settles Suit with Rap Group, COMMERCIAL 
APPEAL (MEMPHIS), June 5, 1996, at A14. 
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transformative uses could be fair use, and it has served as a roadmap for how courts 
should apply the doctrine in appropriation art cases. 
b.  Cases After Campbell 
i.  Developing the Transformative Doctrine 
Subsequent cases reveal that Campbell has had a large effect on the fair use 
landscape, especially in the context of appropriation art.184  Courts have since been 
much less likely to invoke the presumption of unfairness for commercial uses, and 
have increased their focus on transformativeness.185  In fact, certain empirical data 
suggest that a finding of transformativeness is often sufficient to trigger a finding of 
fair use.186  Understanding transformativeness is therefore critical.  This section 
does not seek to undertake an examination of all of the post-Campbell fair use 
cases.  Rather, this section will review a few of the more notable fair use cases 
involving transformative works, particularly appropriation art.  A review of the 
Second Circuit’s ruling in Cariou v. Prince will follow in Part II. 
Since Campbell, courts have had significant trouble with consistently assessing 
transformativeness.  This problem is due in part to the difficulty in devising bright-
line rules on the kinds and degrees of transformation required to find fair use.187  
Appropriation art in particular has presented courts with uniquely difficult 
questions on the scope of copyright law’s protections.  On the one hand, the 
constitutionally stated purpose of copyright law is to promote the progress of 
science and the arts; thus there is a concern that giving too much protection will 
stymie efforts by appropriation artists to explore new types of creative 
expression.188  But, if artists are given carte blanche to create transformative works, 
then the exclusive right of the author to create derivative works could be eliminated 
“since derivative works seem, by definition, to involve some transformation of the 
underlying work.”189 
Judge Leval, cited by the Supreme Court in Campbell, frames the inquiry as 
whether “the secondary use adds value to the original—if copyrightable expression 
in the original work is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new 
 
 184. Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006), and Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 185. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 601–02, 604–05 (2008) 
 186. Id. at 605 (finding that each of the forty out of forty-two total opinions which found the 
defendant’s use to be transformative also found it to be fair use and that one of the two outliers was 
reversed on appeal). 
 187. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 263 (“[Defendant’s] work, like that of other appropriation artists, 
inherently raises difficult questions about the proper scope of copyright protection and the fair-use 
doctrine.  I would continue to answer those questions as necessary to decide particular cases, mindful 
that the fair-use inquiry is a fact-specific one that is ‘not to be simplified with bright-line rules.’” 
(quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577)). 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 189. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 467, 468 (2008). 
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information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.”190  It appears that 
this framework was not immediately embraced by the lower courts.191  In Castle 
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, one of the first major fair use 
cases after Campbell, the Second Circuit found no transformative purpose in a 
trivia book based on the television show “Seinfeld.”192  The court rejected the 
author’s argument that the book was written to educate viewers and provide a 
critical commentary of the show.  Instead, it found the trivia book to be a mere 
repackaging of the show to entertain the show’s audience, and fair use protection 
was denied.193 
Professor Nimmer has commented that the result in Castle Rock was surprising 
given that the work “even if low-brow, necessarily invoke[d] new information and 
new aesthetics.”194  For a time, courts followed the Castle Rock approach of not 
finding transformativeness unless the secondary work parodied or made a direct 
comment on the underlying work.  In other words, adding “new information” and 
“new aesthetics” was not enough.  In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the 
Second Circuit granted fair use protection to a movie poster that mimicked a 
photograph used on a Vanity Fair magazine cover.195  The court interpreted 
Campbell as requiring a secondary use to comment on the original.196  Further, it 
noted that merely “[b]eing different from an original does not inevitably ‘comment’ 
on the original.”197  However, because the advertisement mimicked the original so 
as to “ridicule” it, the poster was deemed to be transformative.198 
Following the Second Circuit’s rulings in these two cases,199 some lower courts 
began to read Campbell’s “new expression, meaning, or message” test as requiring 
that such message or comment, at least in part, point towards the underlying 
work.200  This misreading of Campbell was not expressly corrected until Cariou v. 
Prince.201  But a 2006 case involving appropriation artist Jeff Koons suggested that 
 
 190. Leval, supra note 10, at 1111. 
 191. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][1][b]. 
 192. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Any 
transformative purpose possessed by The SAT is slight to non-existent.”). 
 193. Id. at 142. 
 194. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][1][b]. 
 195. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 196. Id. at 114 (“Applying Campbell to the first-factor analysis, we inquire whether Paramount’s 
advertisement ‘may reasonably be perceived,’ as a new work that ‘at least in part, comments on’ 
Leibovitz’s photograph.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 114, 117 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant). 
 199. But see Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (1997).  This case, as 
opposed to the two cases in the Second Circuit, may have started this trend, although it was not cited in 
Castle Rock.  The court determined that a book portraying O.J. Simpson as the cat in the hat was a satire 
and not parody because it did not “target” the original. 
 200. See Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628–29 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating 
that “voice-overs do not necessarily transform a work,” but still finding the use to be transformative 
because “they are cited as historical reference points in the life of a[n] . . . entertainer”); Cariou v. 
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 201. This lead to a practice by defendants of straining to offer unusual explanations of why their 
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courts would begin to allow fair use for non-parodic transformative works.202 
Blanch v. Koons involved Koons’ “Easyfun-Ethereal” paintings, whereby the 
artist took images from various sources and superimposed them against 
backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.203  One of those paintings, “Niagara,” 
consisted of four pairs of women’s legs dangling over a backdrop of assorted 
pastries.  Koons painted the objects in this painting from magazines and 
advertisements, one of which was adapted from one of plaintiff Andrea Blanch’s 
photographs, which had been used in a print advertisement for Gucci.204  The photo 
“depict[ed] a woman’s lower legs and feet, adorned with bronze nail polish and 
glittery Gucci sandals, resting on a man’s lap in what appears to be a first-class 
airplane cabin.”205  From this image, Koons took only the legs and feet, inverted 
the orientation of the legs, added a heel to one of the feet and changed the 
coloring.206  The court found that the “new expression, meaning or message” test 
“almost perfectly describe[d] Koons’s adaptation.”207 
[T]he use of a fashion photograph created for publication in a glossy American 
“lifestyles” magazine—with changes of its colors, the background against which it is 
portrayed, the medium, the size of the objects pictured, the objects details and, 
crucially, their entirely different purpose and meaning—as part of a massive painting 
commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space.208 
In concluding that “Niagara” was transformative, the court made no mention of 
Koons’ painting commenting directly on the underlying work.  It next considered 
the purpose of the work, writing that because the work was “substantially 
transformative,” its commercialism was of “less significance” to the overall 
analysis.209 
In discussing the first prong of the fair use test, the court first discussed the 
transformative merits of “Niagara,” then separately considered the work’s fair use 
justification as a parody.  Up to that point, most courts, including the Supreme 
Court, had subsumed parody within the transformative inquiry, but the Blanch 
court took a different approach.210  After quickly finding that the work was better 
 
work made a comment on the original, suggesting that such a move was an ex post rationalization of 
their work.  See Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  But see 
Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he 
question is not whether Ghostface Killah intended The Forest purely as a parody of Wonderful World, 
but whether . . . The Forest ‘differs [from the original] in a way that may reasonably be perceived as 
commenting, through ridicule, on what a viewer might reasonably think’ is the unrealistically uplifting 
message of Wonderful World.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 114)). 
 202. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 203. Id. at 247. 
 204. Id. at 247–48. 
 205. Id. at 248. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 253. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 254 (quoting NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 210. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–86 (1994); Castle Rock Entm’t, 
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characterized as satire rather than parody, it sought to justify Koons’ borrowing of 
Blanch’s photograph in particular.211  Framing the issue in this way allowed the 
court to sidestep––but not explicitly overrule––the direct comment inquiry from 
prior cases.  Since parody must borrow in order to “conjure up” the original, the 
court instead asked whether Koons had a “genuine creative rationale for borrowing 
Blanch’s image.”212  Supreme Court precedent holds that a work’s parodic 
character must be “reasonably perceived.”213  By contrast, it might not have been 
appropriate for the Blanch court to have determined whether Koons’ “genuine 
creative rationale” could have been reasonably perceived, as this would have put 
the judge in the position of assessing the work’s artistic merit.214  The court then 
accepted Koons’ stated justification for using the image:  “[t]he ubiquity of the 
photograph is central to my message.”215  While Blanch made substantial inroads in 
correcting the errors of prior courts, Prince was the first to explicitly reject any 
requirements of direct comment on the original.  The next section will explore 
some of the recent issues that courts have dealt with in applying the fourth fair use 
factor in appropriation art cases. 
ii.  Market Effects 
While the Supreme Court once remarked “[t]his last factor is undoubtedly the 
single most important element of fair use,”216 the Court has since changed its view, 
recognizing that all factors “are to be explored, and the results weighed together in 
light of the purposes of copyright.”217  In addition, courts must “consider not only 
the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, 
but also whether [such] unrestricted and widespread conduct . . . would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”218  For 
example, in Salinger v. Colting, the Second Circuit, ruling on a motion for a 
preliminary injunction, found that a Swedish author who wrote an unauthorized 
sequel to Catcher in the Rye was unlikely to prevail in asserting a fair use 
defense.219  Although the sequel was deemed unlikely to impact sales of the 
original, the court found that an unauthorized sequel might undermine the potential 
 
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, 
Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400–02 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 211. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254 (finding that the work’s “message appear[ed] to target the genre 
of [the photograph], rather than the individual photograph itself”). 
 212. Id. at 255. 
 213. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582. 
 214. See id. at 582 (“As Justice Holmes explained ‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of 
the narrowest and most obvious limits.’” (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251 (1903))). 
 215. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. 
 216. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 217. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 218. Id. at 590. 
 219. Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.3d 
68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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market for an authorized Catcher sequel.220 
Part of the difficulty with this inquiry lies in defining the original work’s 
protectable market for derivatives.  It is clear that not all derivative works fall 
within the author’s monopoly.221  The Supreme Court’s standard for defining the 
rights holder’s protectable market “for potential derivative uses includes only those 
that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to 
develop.”222  To that end, some lower courts have held that “copyright owners may 
not preempt exploitation of transformative markets, which they would not ‘in 
general develop or license others to develop,’ by actually developing or licensing 
others to develop those markets.”223  Therefore, the act of an author in licensing 
another to parody or make other transformative uses of his work would not prevent 
others from later entering those markets and successfully claiming fair use.224 
Some courts and scholars have recognized the “danger of circularity” that this 
inquiry poses.225  “[I]t is a given in every fair use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of 
a potential market if that potential is defined as the theoretical market for licensing 
the very use at bar.”226  If this circularity is to be avoided the plaintiff should not be 
able to point to the defendant’s transformative use as evidence that his or her 
potential market for derivatives has been usurped.  Courts have attempted to get 
around this problem by recognizing limits on the concept of a potential market for 
derivatives “by considering only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets.”227  In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit held that an unauthorized trivia 
book based on the television show Seinfeld was “likely to fill a market niche that 
[plaintiff] would in general develop.”228  The fact that the plaintiff had not shown 
any interest in exploiting that market was of no consequence to the court.  In 
Salinger, the Second Circuit went even further, noting that “there is value in the 
right not to authorize derivative works.”229 
But in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., even though the 
 
 220. Id. at 268. 
 221. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
 222. Id. at 592. 
 223. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592). 
 224. See id. at 145 n.11. 
 225. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][4]; see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 
(“And while [plaintiff] would have us find evidence of a rap market in the very facts that [defendant] 
recorded a rap parody of ‘Oh, Pretty Woman’ and another rap group sought a license to record a rap 
derivative, there was no evidence that a potential rap market was harmed in any way by 2 Live Crew’s 
parody, rap version.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“Were a court automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were 
impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in 
the use, the fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”); see also Texaco, 60 F.3d at 
937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“There is a circularity to the problem:  the market will not crystallize unless 
courts reject the fair use argument . . . but, under the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to be an 
infringement unless . . . there is a market to be harmed.”). 
 226. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 50, § 13.05[A][4]. 
 227. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930. 
 228. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145. 
 229. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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plaintiff had shown a willingness to negotiate with the defendant for a license to 
use its images in a book on the Grateful Dead, the court did not find any 
impairment to the market for the original.230  The court relied upon language in 
Castle Rock, holding that because the secondary work was “transformatively 
different” from the original, the original author could not “prevent others from 
entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing or licensing a market for . . . 
transformative uses of its own creative work.’”231  However, the court’s analysis on 
this issue is somewhat unsatisfying because it fails to offer any distinction as to 
where the rights holder’s protectable derivative market ends and where a 
transformative work’s fair use defense begins.  Similarly in Blanch, the court 
determined that because the photographer had acknowledged that she had never 
licensed the work at issue, and that Koons’ use did not “cause any harm to her 
career or upset any plans she had for [the photograph],” the fourth fair use factor 
“greatly favor[ed] Koons.”232  This issue remains open insofar as no articulable test 
has been formulated to resolve the distinction. 
Another issue that courts have yet to resolve is the significance of an increase of 
value caused by the secondary use.  If a defendant could show that its secondary 
use would actually increase the market for the original, a court might find that this 
would favor allowing the use.233  On the other hand, the Supreme Court wrote that 
while “favorable evidence about relevant markets” was important to the defendant 
satisfying its burden of demonstrating fair use, even favorable evidence in certain 
circumstances “is no guarantee of fairness.”234  In a footnote, the Court cites 
Leval’s example of a “film producer’s appropriation of a composer’s previously 
unknown song that turns the song into a commercial success; the boon to the song 
does not make the film’s simple copying fair.”235  It is important to recognize that 
this example would likely fail the fair use test because such a use would be 
unjustified under the first factor, and that the final outcome might be different if the 
work is transformative.236  The bottom line is that the Supreme Court has not yet 
directly confronted these questions; therefore, lower courts are free to construct 
their own tests and approaches to this specific issue. 
II.  CARIOU V. PRINCE 
This Part will closely examine the Prince decision, including how it changes the 
fair use framework, specifically with respect to the first and fourth fair use prongs 
of § 107. 
 
 230. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 231. Id. at 615 (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11). 
 232. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 233. See Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 614 n.5. 
 234. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 & n.21 (1994).  But see id. (“Market 
harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this factor will vary, not only with the amount of 
harm, but also with the relative strength of the showing on the other factors.”). 
 235. Id. (citing Leval, supra note 10, at 1124 n.84). 
 236. See Leval, supra note 10, at 1124 n.84.  Also note that licensing music for film is a paradigm 
of a protectable traditional market for derivatives. 
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A.  TRANSFORMATIVENESS 
As discussed in Part II.C.2, fair use cases after Campbell placed a heavy 
emphasis on commentary.  But commentary is only one of the express purposes 
provided in the introductory paragraph to § 107, and the House Report does not 
indicate that commentary is a necessary element of fair use.  In addition, there have 
been many cases outside of the appropriation context where fair use was found 
despite the lack of direct comment.237  Is there something about appropriation that 
should make direct commentary necessary in those cases?  The Second Circuit 
answered that question in the negative in Cariou v. Prince.238 
Richard Prince is a well-known appropriation artist, whose work “involve[s] 
taking photographs and other images that others have produced and incorporating 
them into paintings and collages that he then presents, in a different context, as his 
own.”239  Patrick Cariou, the plaintiff, is a photographer who spent several years 
living among Rastafarians in Jamaica.240  He assembled photographs that he took 
during this time into a book, Yes Rasta.241  Prince came across a copy of this book 
and decided to use some of its images in a series of collages that would be entitled 
Canal Zone.242  Twenty-nine of the thirty Canal Zone works incorporated Cariou’s 
images in different ways, “vary[ing] significantly from piece to piece.”243 
In certain works, such as James Brown Disco Ball, Prince affixed headshots from Yes 
Rasta onto other appropriated images, all of which Prince placed on a canvas that he 
had painted.  In these, Cariou’s work is almost entirely obscured.  The Prince artworks 
also incorporate photographs that have been enlarged or tinted, and incorporate 
photographs appropriated from artists other than Cariou as well.  Yes Rasta is a book 
of photographs measuring approximately 9.5” x 12”.  Prince’s artworks, in contrast, 
comprise inkjet printing and acrylic paint, as well as pasted-on elements, and are 
several times that size.  . . .  In other works, such as Graduation, Cariou’s original 
work is readily apparent:  Prince did little more than paint blue lozenges over the 
subject’s eyes and mouth, and paste a picture of a guitar over the subject’s body.244 
The Gagosian Gallery in New York exhibited twenty-two Canal Zone works 
and also published and sold an exhibition catalog from the show that featured all of 
the pieces in the series.245  Upon hearing about the show, Cariou sued Prince, the 
 
 237. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Ty v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 
F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2013 WL 6017130 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
2013); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 238. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 239. Id. at 699. 
 240. See id. at 698. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 699. 
 243. Id. at 700. 
 244. Id. at 700–01.  Images of the Prince artworks, along with the Yes Rasta photographs, were 
included in an appendix to the Prince opinion.  See Appendix to Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013) (No. 11-1197) [hereinafter Prince Appendix], available at http://perma.cc/6RWW-LGG6. 
 245. Id. at 703. 
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gallery and its owner for copyright infringement.246  Prince raised a fair use 
defense, arguing that his use of the photographs as “‘raw ingredients’ in the 
creation of new works” was fair use.247  This reasoning was rejected by the district 
court, which was “aware of no precedent holding that such use is fair absent 
transformative comment on the original.”248  The Second Circuit reversed this 
ruling, stating that “[t]he law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the 
original or its author in order to be considered transformative.”249  Indeed, language 
found in a footnote in a decision by the Supreme Court suggests that the court of 
appeals’ interpretation is correct.  In Campbell, the Court wrote:  “We express no 
opinion as to the derivative markets for works using elements of an original as 
vehicles for satire or amusement, making no comment on the original or criticism 
of it.”250 
The court of appeals reiterated the “new expression, meaning, or message” 
test,251 and proceeded to examine the transformative qualities of the pieces: 
Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape 
photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, 
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.  . . .  
Prince has created collages on canvas that incorporate color, feature distorted human 
and other forms and settings, and measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the 
size of the photographs.  Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and 
media are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, as is the 
expressive nature of Prince’s work.252 
At this point in the analysis, the court in Blanch looked to the artist’s subjective 
justifications for using the particular underlying work.  Here, “Prince’s work could 
be transformative even without . . . Prince’s stated intention to do so.  Rather than 
confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanations of his artworks, we instead examine 
how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived’ in order to assess their 
transformative nature.”253  The court was careful to note that not just any cosmetic 
changes to the photographs would be fair use per se:  “For instance, a derivative 
work that merely presents the same material but in a new form, such as a book of 
synopses of televisions shows, is not transformative.”254  The court found that 
twenty-five of Prince’s images “g[a]ve Cariou’s photographs a new expression, and 
employ[ed] new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct from 
Cariou’s.”255 
 
 246. Id. at 704. 
 247. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013). 
 250. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 n.22. 
 251. Prince, 714 F.3d at 706 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 707 (but noting that if Prince had provided explanations for his use, they “might have 
lent strong support to his defense.”). 
 254. Id. at 708. 
 255. Id. 
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While the court was able to rule that twenty-five of the thirty works were 
transformative as a matter of law, the five remaining works “present[ed] closer 
questions.”256  These five works, in the court’s view, did not differ from the 
underlying photographs to the same extent as the other twenty-five pieces.  
Although there were “key differences” in these secondary works compared to the 
incorporated originals, they were “still similar in key aesthetic ways.”257 
Graduation, for instance, is tinted blue, and the jungle background is in softer focus 
than in Cariou’s original.  Lozenges painted over the subject’s eyes and mouth—an 
alteration that appears frequently throughout the Canal Zone artworks—make the 
subject appear anonymous, rather than as the strong individual who appears in the 
original.  Along with the enlarged hands and electric guitar that Prince pasted onto his 
canvas, those alterations create the impression that the subject is not quite human.  
Cariou’s photograph, on the other hand, presents a human being in his natural habitat, 
looking intently ahead.  Where the photograph presents someone comfortably at home 
in nature, Graduation combines divergent elements to create a sense of discomfort.  . . . 
. . . Charlie Company prominently displays four copies of Cariou’s photograph of a 
Rastafarian riding a donkey, substantially unaltered, as well as two copies of a seated 
nude woman with lozenges covering all six faces.  Like the other works just discussed, 
Charlie Company is aesthetically similar to Cariou’s original work because it maintains 
the pastoral background and individual focal point of the original photograph—in this 
case, the man on the burro.  While the lozenges, repetition of the images, and addition 
of the nude female unarguably change the tenor of the piece, it is unclear whether these 
alterations amount to a sufficient transformation of the original work of art such that 
the new work is transformative.258 
The court’s detailed analysis of the differences between these five works and the 
others may be more descriptive than instructive.  Aside from the court’s holding 
that no direct comment on the original is necessary to find transformativeness, the 
analysis leaves much to be desired by way of precise rules that can be used by 
courts in the future.  However, this is not necessarily a fault in the decision.  The 
fair use inquiry is intended to be flexible and case-specific.  On the other hand, the 
vagueness of the court’s ruling might hamper its reach.  At least one scholar has 
argued that the inherent uncertainty of the fair use defense combined with stiff 
statutory penalties for copyright infringement might produce chilling effects.259  
Some works that would qualify as falling under fair use might not be created or 
disseminated because the doctrine’s indeterminacy leaves open the possibility that 
a court will rule against the secondary use.260  Another concern with the Prince 
decision is that it might put courts back in a position of judging the artistic merits 
of a work.  A concurring opinion in Prince raised this very issue and argued that 
the court should have remanded all thirty paintings and allowed the district court to 
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apply the correct legal standard.261 
Instead of looking at the superficial similarities of two works, courts should 
consider whether the second work is transformative in its meaning.  Professor 
Laura Heymann has argued that, instead of evaluating artistic merit or probing 
authorial intentions, judges should measure how audiences have reacted to the 
work.262  Heymann’s thesis is built on Roland Barthes’ reader-response theory, 
which recognizes that the interpretation of artwork is always contextual.263  The 
reader, viewer or listener is the one who ultimately determines the meaning of the 
work, and therefore judges should consider evidence of audience response in 
copyright cases.264  The test should be “the amount of the interpretive distance that 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work creates.”265  If a “distinct and separate 
discursive community” has developed around the secondary work, then that 
indicates a substantial interpretive distance between the two works.266  A discursive 
community is made up of those who engage with the work, and the discourse is 
formed as that community begins to offer its interpretations of the work.  “If 
distinct discursive communities can be identified surrounding each copy, that fact 
should lead us to think that the meaning of the expression has been transformed, 
even if the expression itself has not.”267 
Returning to a previous example, the discursive community that engaged with 
Jay-Z’s “Hard Knock Life” was likely very different from that which engaged with 
Annie.268  This is due to the fact the Jay-Z’s song signifies something different from 
Annie; thus, the former is not attempting to displace the latter.  In the case of 
Richard Prince, reader response is critical because the value of his work arguably 
lies in its meaning rather than its graphic merits.  “The discursive community 
formed around Prince’s work through gallery displays and critical reception 
(whether positive or negative) indicates that their activities are transformative in the 
way fair use should care about.”269  In this regard, the Second Circuit erred in 
focusing on the extrinsic aspects of his work, rather than the intrinsic.  However the 
Prince court did not say that an extrinsic analysis was the hallmark of the 
transformative test; rather, the inquiry is whether the new work “alter[s] the first 
with new expression, meaning or message.”270  Therefore the decision does not 
foreclose an intrinsic analysis from playing a meaningful role in the fair use test— 
the Prince court simply failed to conduct it. 
Another note about the Prince decision is that the court found the use to be fair 
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even though it involved a direct copying from another work.  Prince took the 
images from Cariou’s book, whereas in Blanch, Jeff Koons copied an image by 
repainting it.  The Prince court does not discuss this difference.  Whether this was 
an oversight or not, it was the correct result.  Since all art is, to a degree, 
representational, it should not make a difference that one artist has taken the time to 
repaint a photograph while another has merely taken that photograph.  This 
consideration will serve as an important undercurrent to the analysis in Part III, 
where I argue that certain types of sampling—a form of direct copying—are now 
fair use. 
B.  MARKET EFFECTS 
In the Second Circuit, courts have asked whether the secondary work “usurps” 
the original’s potential derivative market.271  In making this determination, the 
Prince court wrote that a market has been usurped “where the infringer’s target 
audience and the nature of the infringing content is the same as the original.”272  
The court resolved this issue by noting that the audiences for works by Cariou and 
Prince were “entirely different.”273  This reasoning is problematic.  It appears that 
the court found “entirely different” audiences on the basis of Prince attracting “a 
number of . . . wealthy and famous” individuals such as Jay-Z and Angelina 
Jolie.274  It should not make a difference that Prince was able to sell eight artworks 
for more than ten million dollars, whereas Cariou had not “actively marketed his 
work or sold work for significant sums.”275  Courts should not privilege one artist’s 
right to create over another’s merely because they do not frequent the same social 
circles or because they achieved different degrees of economic success. 
However, in Prince, the Second Circuit is struggling with one of the most 
difficult problems in the fair use analysis—defining the relevant market—and is 
attempting to avoid the previously mentioned problems of circularity and proof.276  
Instead of its different audiences test, the court should have returned to a standard 
used in previous decisions, asking whether the licensing of photographs for 
appropriation art would constitute a “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed market[].”277  Nothing in the record suggested that Prince’s work would 
stymie subsequent attempts by Cariou to license his work for derivative uses; thus 
the court could have reached a similar conclusion as it did in Blanch, finding no 
market usurpation.278  That a conclusion could have been reached without invoking 
the novel and unsatisfying different audiences test suggests that the court’s 
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JULIAN AZRAN, HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69 (2014) 
2014] HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING 101 
reasoning in this area went beyond what was necessary. 
Part II has discussed the Prince case and its contributions to the fair use 
standard.  Part III will apply to the Prince framework to a hypothetical sampling 
case. 
III.  SAMPLING AS FAIR USE:  APPLYING CARIOU TO SAMPLING 
In this Part, I argue that the Prince ruling can be applied to many instances of 
sampling.  Prince stands for the proposition that certain transformative derivative 
works of appropriation art can qualify as fair use.  In that regard, the sampling 
cases seem inconsistent with this ruling.  Having already explored how the fair use 
factors have been addressed in the context of visual appropriation art, this Part will 
apply those principles to a hypothetical sampling case in order to demonstrate that 
music has been held to a different standard from other artistic works, and that this 
should be corrected.  If the standards applied in Prince were applied in sampling 
cases, then recording artists would have greater ability to sample without invariably 
having to seek permission for all samples.  This Part will also discuss some of the 
shortcomings of the Prince opinion mentioned in Part II, and how courts might 
avoid making similar errors. 
A.  PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE 
Transformativeness is only one element of the first factor of the fair use test, 
though it is the one courts tend to emphasize.  Also to be considered is whether the 
work is used for commercial or educational purposes.  Many commercial works 
have been afforded the fair use defense.279  Almost all music is released for 
commercial purposes, and sample-based music is no exception.  But certain 
instances of sampling are more transformative than others and are therefore more 
likely to qualify as fair use.  To facilitate this analysis, a two-dimensional spectrum 
of transformative works is assumed, with works of minimal transformative value at 
one end, and works of maximum transformative value at the other end. 
A song such as “Holla” by Ghostface would lie close to the extreme end of 
minimal transformative value.280  The song features Ghostface rapping over The 
Delfonics’ “La-La (Means I Love You).”281  The sample has not been altered in 
any way so as to change the aesthetic of the original; the meaning of the original 
song is maintained, and the only part added is Ghostface’s vocals.  This is a 
different case from “Hard Knock Life,” where Jay-Z flips the Annie music into an 
ironic comment about race and class, completely redefining the meaning of the 
original song.  Therefore, from both an extrinsic and intrinsic perspective, “Holla” 
has minimal transformative value, and thus would probably not constitute fair 
 
 279. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“The more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 280. GHOSTFACE, Holla, on THE PRETTY TONEY ALBUM (Def Jam 2004). 
 281. THE DELFONICS, La-La (Means I Love You), on LA LA MEANS I LOVE YOU (Philly Groove 
Records 1968). 
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use.282 
At the opposite end of the spectrum would be “Bring the Noise” by Public 
Enemy, produced by The Bomb Squad, a song with much transformative value.283  
“Bring the Noise” features approximately nine samples, and each one serves as a 
fragmentary piece of the song’s background music.284  This analysis will examine 
three of the more prominently used samples, the first of which is a two-second horn 
part taken from Marva Whitney’s “It’s My Thing.”285  This snippet was “chopped” 
into smaller pieces and then reorganized to create a new melody, which is looped at 
various points of the song.286  The second sample is a three-note arpeggiated guitar 
riff from Funkadelic’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” which is distorted and 
obscured behind other parts to sound like a siren.287  The last sample, James 
Brown’s “Get Up, Get Into It, Get Involved” (“Get Up”), has been completely 
changed.288  The Bomb Squad took a guitar riff and “scratched” the record on a 
turntable, completely changing its sonic character. 
Finding that a work has transformative value does not depend on the work 
making a direct comment on any of the sampled works.289  Instead, the test is 
whether a work adds “new expression, meaning or message.”290  As noted in Part 
II, a court administering this test should consider both intrinsic and extrinsic 
elements of the new work.291  Simply adding new expression does not mean the use 
will be fair; the amount of new expression must be compared with how much of the 
original work is used.292 
In Prince, the court noted that there was transformative value in the fact that 
Prince did not simply take Cariou’s photos and paste them on his canvas.293  
Instead, Prince cut out specific parts of Cariou’s images and drew on top of them, 
thus changing their aesthetic character and perhaps reducing the amount taken 
under the second factor of the fair use test.  In “Bring the Noise,” each of the 
samples is set against a backdrop of drums, bass and other sounds that were added 
 
 282. Instances where substantial portions are taken from a sound recording are outside the scope of 
this Note and will not be addressed further. 
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by Public Enemy from other sources.  Public Enemy took the horns from “It’s My 
Thing” and altered them to create a new melody.  “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” and 
“Get Up” were revamped in a similar fashion.  The guitar riffs from these songs are 
distorted and manipulated in ways that leave them “almost entirely obscured.”294  
The aggregate effect of this distorted collage gives rise to an energy of rebellion, 
which is distinct from each of the underlying works. 
From the foregoing analysis it is clear “Bring the Noise” is transformative with 
respect to at least three of its sampled sound recordings.  The next issue is whether 
there is any appropriation of samples’ underlying compositions.  Unlike sound 
recordings, claims of musical composition infringement are not adjudicated with 
bright-line rules.295  Therefore, before analyzing the fair use merits on this issue, 
infringement must first be established.  Using the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Newton v. Diamond, the issue is whether any of the samples embody qualitatively 
or quantitatively substantial portions of original works’ musical compositions.296 
First, Public Enemy altered the horn part taken from “It’s My Thing” such that 
the notes are played in a sequence different from the original.  By creating a new 
melody in this way, Public Enemy avoids copying any of the original’s underlying 
composition.  This is in contrast to Newton v. Diamond, where the Beastie Boys did 
not alter the sample’s sequence of three notes.297  Second, Public Enemy chose to 
leave the three-note sequence from “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” intact.  However, 
after focusing solely on the melody and rhythm of the sampled guitar part, a court 
or jury would probably find that the three-note arpeggio lacks sufficient originality 
to merit copyright protection, leaving no grounds for finding infringement.298  The 
last sample, “Get Up,” is distorted such that the original melody is no longer 
present in “Bring the Noise.”  Thus, not one of these three samples in “Bring the 
Noise” is likely to qualify as infringement of the underlying compositions.  
Because a fair use defense is only raised after infringement is found, Public Enemy 
would only defend its appropriation of the sound recordings, not the underlying 
compositions. 
B.  NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK 
The Supreme Court has held that creative works fall within the core of 
copyright’s protective purposes.299  The Second Circuit has elaborated on this 
factor by noting that it “may be of limited use where the creative work of art is 
being used for a transformative purpose.”300  Such is the case here, so that while 
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this factor cuts against a finding of fair use, that disposition is weakened by the 
transformative values inherent in “Bring the Noise.” 
C.  AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE PORTION USED 
With respect to the third factor of the fair use test, the Supreme Court has 
directed that “the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use.”301  The inquiry is directed not only to the amount of material 
taken from the original, but also to the taken material’s quality and importance to 
the original work.302  This is where parody’s advantage lies in the fair use analysis.  
Because a parody takes direct aim at the original work, it must be allowed to 
“conjure up” enough of the original to make it recognizable.303  Because sampling 
usually lacks such direct comment, the amount of taking allowable will probably be 
less than in the case of a parody.  However, a transformative work will still be able 
to borrow enough from the original to fulfill its transformative purpose.304 
The focus of this inquiry is on the proportion of the original work that was taken 
and used in the new work.305  It was at this point in the analysis in Prince that the 
court of appeals was unable to grant summary judgment to the defendants with 
respect to five of the thirty works at issue.306  By comparing these five works to the 
originals, it is evident that a large proportion of the original photographs have been 
taken.307  For example, the photograph used for Meditation features a man standing 
in shorts amongst foliage.308  For the new work, it appears that Prince cut out the 
subject from the background and placed the cut-out against a blank backdrop, tinted 
it to give it a reddish overtone, and added lozenges and a guitar with hands.309  
Even though Prince did not use the whole photograph, the court might have taken 
issue with Prince taking a qualitatively substantial part of the original.310  For 
Canal Zone (2008), which borrowed from six Cariou photographs, the court found 
that the “cumulative effect” of the work was not dissimilar from many of the Yes 
Rasta photographs, namely “subject[s] in a habitat replete with lush greenery.”311  
Although the court does not fully explain its reason for remanding this particular 
work, this language suggests that the aesthetic of Canal Zone (2008) resembles the 
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originals to the extent that Cariou’s photographs might be superseded.312  If the jury 
were to make such a finding, that would undercut Prince’s fair use claim.313 
Shifting to an analysis of “Bring the Noise,” that the song consists almost 
entirely of samples does not matter.314  The focus is on how much has been taken 
from each sample.  First, Public Enemy only took a small snippet from the bridge 
section of “It’s My Thing.”  Second, less than three seconds is used from the 
introduction to “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”  Third, a very short fragment has been 
appropriated from “Get Up.”  Finally, it is important to observe that the 
“cumulative effect” of “Bring the Noise” is substantially different from all three of 
the samples in question.315  The overall aesthetic of the new song can be 
characterized as a sonic collage geared towards a hip-hop audience, whereas none 
of the original works feature any samples or rapping.  This analysis suggests that 
Public Enemy has not appropriated too much from the original works, which would 
militate against a finding of fair use. 
D.  EFFECT ON THE POTENTIAL MARKET 
The fourth factor of the fair use test looks to the effect of the secondary use upon 
two separate potential markets for the original work.316  The first is the market for 
the original work, and the second is the market for derivative works.317  In cases 
where the second work is transformative, there is less of a risk for market 
substitution, and market harm cannot be presumed.318  It is important to avoid the 
“danger of circularity” identified by Nimmer—that is, a court should not find that a 
plaintiff’s market has necessarily been usurped merely because the defendant used 
the plaintiff’s work.319  Adding to this difficulty is the focus on potentiality, which 
can present the defendant with severe problems of proof.320 
The Second Circuit has approached this issue in different ways.  In American 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, the court looked to whether the potential market in 
question was “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed.”321  In Prince, the 
court wrote that a market has been usurped “where the infringer’s target audience 
and the nature of the infringing content is the same as the original.”322 
The deficiencies of the Prince audiences test were explained in Part II.B, above.  
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Nevertheless, I argue that under either test there is no viable market for 
transformative fragmentary sample licenses, such as the three used in “Bring the 
Noise.”  Building off of Part I.B.2’s discussion of market failure, I argue that the 
Bridgeport ruling led to an industry practice of clearing even the most fragmentary 
uses of sound recordings, and that this created an artificial and inefficient market.  
For these reasons, Bridgeport should be overturned.  Finally I argue certain 
transformative samples do not usurp the original’s potential market and should 
therefore qualify as fair use. 
The decisions in Grand Upright and Bridgeport led to the industry practice of 
licensing any and all samples, no matter how small, which has created an artificial 
market.323  The bright-line rule in Bridgeport has been widely criticized and should 
be overturned.324  The Bridgeport bright-line rule added certainty to the market, but 
it did so at the expense of pushing certainty to an extreme.  To the extent that 
relevant actors in the music industry were already risk-averse and likely to obtain 
licenses notwithstanding the bright-line rule, the decision has magnified those 
behaviors and led to market distortions.  By requiring all samples to be licensed, 
the court left musicians vulnerable to more lawsuits.325  It also increased the 
incentive to settle, as defendants know that doing so will be cheaper than litigation, 
which has led to a rise in wasteful sample trolls.326  Additionally, although the court 
held that there was no de minimis defense to sound recording infringement, it 
explicitly did not foreclose a fair use defense by a sampler.327  Therefore, in a 
similar case, a court will have to conduct a four-prong fair use analysis instead of 
applying the much simpler de minimis doctrine.  This will lead to a more complex 
fact-specific analysis that is less amenable to summary judgment, thus increasing 
litigation costs. 
It is notable that there have not been any significant sampling cases since 
Bridgeport.  As the court predicted, its decision has removed uncertainties from the 
marketplace and virtually eliminated litigation on this issue.  Instead, it seems that 
labels and artists are more content to license all samples, no matter how little is 
taken, rather than risk being sued and incurring substantial legal fees while arguing 
fair use.  Thus, even though Bridgeport explicitly left the fair use defense available, 
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relevant actors have not been acting on that assumption, and instead have presumed 
that all samples require a license. 
This has led to market activity that would not exist but for the ruling.  For 
example, the song “Nosetalgia” by Pusha T and Kendrick Lamar contains three 
licensed samples, one of which will be the focus of this discussion.328  The song 
contains a sample from “D’Ya Like Scratchin’?” by Malcolm McLaren, consisting 
of a voice asking, “what is it?”329  This borrowed portion is less than one second 
long, it is altered with various echoing effects and it appears twice in the new work.  
Thus, the sample taken is not qualitatively or quantitatively significant to the 
original work and the use is transformative (the third and first factors of fair use, 
respectively).  But for any potential market effects, the borrowing would probably 
qualify as fair use.  The only reason why there would be market effects is because 
relevant parties in the music industry are acting in a bright-line regime where they 
assume that all unlicensed sampling constitutes infringement.  But if the Bridgeport 
court had instead used the same substantial similarity analysis used in other 
copyright infringement contexts and allowed for a de minimis defense, then 
samples such as the one used in “Nosetalgia” would not have to be licensed and 
there would be no market for them.  Comparing this result to that in the Prince case 
serves as an illustration for how the legal rules in the visual art context differ from 
those in the musical context, even though both are forms of appropriation art.  By 
overruling Bridgeport, this inequality would be corrected. 
If Bridgeport had not eliminated the de minimis defense, then de minimis 
samples would not be licensed, and this particular market would not have 
developed.330  By acknowledging that this artificial market is a form of market 
failure, courts could easily find no market harm and allow fragmentary 
transformative samples as fair use.  In other words, when an artist uses a 
fragmentary sample, he or she is not usurping any market because it should not 
have existed in the first place.  Even if courts are not willing to ignore the market, it 
should not change the analysis significantly given that potential market effects is 
not the most important factor of the fair use test.331 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The fair use doctrine has and will continue to develop in response to changes in 
technology and art, which was Congress’ intent when it enacted the statute.  Prince 
has expanded the role that transformativeness will play in the fair use analysis and 
serves as an example of how courts have adapted the doctrinal framework to new 
 
 328. PUSHA T & KENDRICK LAMAR, Nosetalgia, on MY NAME IS MY NAME (GOOD Music/Def 
Jam 2013). 
 329. MALCOLM MCLAREN & THE WORLD’S FAMOUS SUPREME TEAM, D’ya Like Scratchin’?, on 
D’YA LIKE SCRATCHIN’? (Island Records 1983). 
 330. To be clear, this Note does not argue that the market for all sample licenses is artificial.  From 
that broader market, I only identify as artificial the market for samples that would be considered de 
minimis but for the Bridgeport decision. 
 331. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
JULIAN AZRAN, HOW CARIOU V. PRINCE WILL REVITALIZE SAMPLING, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69 (2014) 
108 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:1 
forms of art.  Up to this point, legal rules have had an adverse effect on creative 
output in hip-hop, by limiting the amount of samples that can be used in any given 
work.  This Note has argued that sampling, as a form of appropriation art, deserves 
equal treatment in the fair use sphere.  Creativity will be enhanced if artists have 
fewer economic constraints in sampling from multiple sources, thus fulfilling 
copyright’s goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”332 
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